Free PRAXIS READING SECTION Exam Braindumps
PRAXIS Reading Section Questions 31–35 (page: 8)

Read the following passages and answer the question.

Passage 1. Because it is filled with contradictions, performance is also filled with risk. This is the domain of stage fright. The actor is aware that appearing in front of an audience is a scary proposition. Maintaining the reality of the character is, in itself, a fragile affair; it demands of the actor a series of complex transformations. The actor has the unique problem of hiding and showing at the same time. The actor’s conscious fear is not about making a mistake, but about allowing the audience to see something that it is not supposed to see: namely, the performer’s fear, or stage fright.
Passage 2. The term “stage fright” has largely dropped out of use, because we know now that dwelling on something this malevolent gives it power. If I tell you not to be afraid, you may dwell on your fear. If I say, do not think of fast-food burgers under any circumstances, a line of them will parade through your mind. The key to most fears is substitution. On the simplest level, you replace the ogre with something less menacing to fill your consciousness. If you will imagine yourself to be a host rather than an actor, and think more about the comfort of your listeners than their verdicts, everything will fall into place.

How do the passages view stage fright in relation to human behavior in general?

Read the following passages and answer the question.

Passage 1. Because it is filled with contradictions, performance is also filled with risk. This is the domain of stage fright. The actor is aware that appearing in front of an audience is a scary proposition. Maintaining the reality of the character is, in itself, a fragile affair; it demands of the actor a series of complex transformations. The actor has the unique problem of hiding and showing at the same time. The actor’s conscious fear is not about making a mistake, but about allowing the audience to see something that it is not supposed to see: namely, the performer’s fear, or stage fright.
Passage 2. The term “stage fright” has largely dropped out of use, because we know now that dwelling on something this malevolent gives it power. If I tell you not to be afraid, you may dwell on your fear. If I say, do not think of fast-food burgers under any circumstances, a line of them will parade through your mind. The key to most fears is substitution. On the simplest level, you replace the ogre with something less menacing to fill your consciousness. If you will imagine yourself to be a host rather than an actor, and think more about the comfort of your listeners than their verdicts, everything will fall into place.

Which of the following describes an actor coping with stage fright by following the advice of the author of Passage 2?

Read the following passage and answer the question.

The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years.

The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of classification. The classifications (also known as taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analogical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups — plants, animals, and humans. According to this classification, human beings are not a special kind of animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus, any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treating plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their environments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the human species is unique. In the first, it has a kingdom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees not count as a genuine language. I have never been able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages", but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how ingenious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made.
Similar observations hold for rationality and anything a computer might do.

According to the author, what is most responsible for influencing our perception of a comparison between species?

Read the following passage and answer the question.

The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years.
The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of classification. The classifications (also known as taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analogical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups — plants, animals, and humans. According to this classification, human beings are not a special kind of animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus, any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treating plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their environments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the human species is unique. In the first, it has a kingdom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees not count as a genuine language. I have never been able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages", but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how ingenious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made.
Similar observations hold for rationality and anything a computer might do.

Which of the following is NOT possible within an Aristotelian classification scheme?

Read the following passage and answer the question.

The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years.
The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of classification. The classifications (also known as taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analogical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups — plants, animals, and humans. According to this classification, human beings are not a special kind of animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus, any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treating plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their environments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the human species is unique. In the first, it has a kingdom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees not count as a genuine language. I have never been able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages", but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how ingenious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made.
Similar observations hold for rationality and anything a computer might do.

If the author had wished to explain why "most" people feel the way they do, the explanation would have probably focused on: