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Scholastic Aptitude Test Exam Questions 273–280 (page: 36)

Updated On: 31-Jul-2026

Passage 1 is adapted from Catharine Beecher, Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism. Originally published in 1837. Passage 2 is adapted from Angelina E. Grimk ֳ ©, Letters to Catharine Beecher. Originally published in 1838. Grimk ֳ © encouraged Southern women to oppose slavery publicly. Passage 1 is Beecher's response to Grimk ֳ ©'s views. Passage 2 is Grimk ֳ ©'s response to Beecher. Passage 1 -Heaven has appointed to one sex the superior, and to the other the subordinate station, and this without any reference to the character or conduct of either. It is therefore as much for the dignity as it is for the interest of females, in all respects to conform to the duties of this relation... But while woman holds a subordinate relation in society to the other sex, it is not because it was designed that her duties or her influence should be any the less important, or all pervading. But it was designed that the mode of gaining influence and of exercising power should be altogether different and peculiar... A man may act on society by the collision of intellect, in public debate; he may urge his measures by a sense of shame, by fear and by personal interest; he may coerce by the combination of public sentiment; he may drive by physical force, and he does not outstep the boundaries of his sphere. But all the power, and all the conquests that are lawful to woman, are those only which appeal to the kindly, generous, peaceful and benevolent principles. Woman is to win everything by peace and love; by making herself so much respected, esteemed and loved, that to yield to her opinions and to gratify her wishes, will be the free will offering of the heart. But this is to be all accomplished in the domestic and social circle. There let every woman become so cultivated and refined in intellect, that her taste and judgment will be respected; so benevolent in feeling and action; that her motives will be reverenced; `" so unassuming and unambitious, that collision and competition will be banished; `" so `gentle and easy to be entreated,` as that every heart will repose in her presence; then, the fathers, the husbands, and the sons, will find an influence thrown around them, to which they will yield not only willingly but proudly... A woman may seek the aid of co-operation and combination among her own sex, to assist her in her appropriate offices of piety, charity, maternal and domestic duty; but whatever, in any measure, throws a woman into the attitude of a combatant, either for herself or others `" whatever binds her in a party conflict `" whatever obliges her in any way to exert coercive influences, throws her out of her appropriate sphere. If these general principles are correct, they are entirely opposed to the plan of arraying females in any Abolition movement. Passage 2 -The investigation of the rights of the slave has led me to a better understanding of my own. I have found the Anti-Slavery cause to be the high school of morals in our land `" the school in which human rights are more fully investigated, and better understood and taught, than in any other. Here a great fundamental principle is uplifted and illuminated, and from this central light, rays innumerable stream all around. Human beings have rights, because they are moral beings: the rights of all men grow out of their moral nature; and as all men have the same moral nature, they have essentially the same rights. These rights may be wrested from the slave, but they cannot be alienated: his title to himself is as perfect now, as is that of
Lyman Beecher*: it is stamped on his moral being, and is, like it, imperishable. Now if rights are founded in the nature of our moral being, then the mere circumstance of sex does not give to man higher rights and responsibilities, than to woman. To suppose that it does, would be to deny the self-evident truth, that the `physical constitution is the mere instrument of the moral nature.` To suppose that it does, would be to break up utterly the relations, of the two natures, and to reverse their functions, exalting the animal nature into a monarch, and humbling the moral into a slave; making the former a proprietor, and the latter its property.
When human beings are regarded as moral beings, sex, instead of being enthroned upon the summit, administering upon rights and responsibilities, sinks into insignificance and nothingness. My doctrine then is, that whatever it is morally right for man to do, it is morally right for woman to do. Our duties originate, not from difference of sex, but from the diversity of our relations in life, the various gifts and talents committed to our care, and the different eras in which we live. * Lyman Beecher was a famous minister and the father of Catharine Beecher.
What is Grimk ֳ ©'s central claim in Passage 2?

  1. The rights of individuals are not determined by race or gender.
  2. Men and women must learn to work together to improve society.
  3. Moral rights are the most important distinction between human beings and animals.
  4. Men and women should have equal opportunities to flourish.

Answer(s): A

Explanation:

Justification
Option A correctly captures Grimké’s central claim: she argues that moral rights are inherent to all human beings, independent of race or gender, and therefore any system that denies rights on the basis of sex or color is morally indefensible. This is evident in her assertion that “the rights of all men grow out of their moral nature” and that “the mere circumstance of sex does not give to man higher rights and responsibilities than to woman.”
Option B misrepresents the passage.
While Grimké does call for cooperation among women, her primary focus is on the universality of moral rights, not specifically on men and women working together. The text emphasizes that “whatever it is morally right for man to do, it is morally right for woman to do,” which is a claim about equal moral standing, not a call for joint labor.
Option C introduces a comparison between humans and animals that is not present in the excerpt. Grimké discusses moral rights and the equality of sexes, but she never frames moral rights as the “most important distinction between human beings and animals.” This option adds an element absent from the source.
Option D is close in spirit but is broader and less precise than the passage’s explicit argument. Grimké does not merely advocate for “equal opportunities to flourish”; she grounds her claim in the immutable nature of moral rights, insisting that sex cannot alter those rights. Option A directly reflects this foundational principle.
Conclusion Option A is the best answer because it precisely encapsulates Grimké’s central thesis that moral rights are universal and not contingent on race or gender, a point she defends through philosophical reasoning about human nature.


Reference:

Beecher, C. (1837). An Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism. Grimké, A. E. (1838). Letters to Catharine Beecher.
(Online versions available at the Library of Congress digital collections and the Internet Archive.)



Passage 1 is adapted from Catharine Beecher, Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism. Originally published in 1837. Passage 2 is adapted from Angelina E. Grimk ֳ ©, Letters to Catharine Beecher. Originally published in 1838. Grimk ֳ © encouraged Southern women to oppose slavery publicly. Passage 1 is Beecher's response to Grimk ֳ ©'s views. Passage 2 is Grimk ֳ ©'s response to Beecher. Passage 1 -Heaven has appointed to one sex the superior, and to the other the subordinate station, and this without any reference to the character or conduct of either. It is therefore as much for the dignity as it is for the interest of females, in all respects to conform to the duties of this relation... But while woman holds a subordinate relation in society to the other sex, it is not because it was designed that her duties or her influence should be any the less important, or all pervading. But it was designed that the mode of gaining influence and of exercising power should be altogether different and peculiar... A man may act on society by the collision of intellect, in public debate; he may urge his measures by a sense of shame, by fear and by personal interest; he may coerce by the combination of public sentiment; he may drive by physical force, and he does not outstep the boundaries of his sphere. But all the power, and all the conquests that are lawful to woman, are those only which appeal to the kindly, generous, peaceful and benevolent principles. Woman is to win everything by peace and love; by making herself so much respected, esteemed and loved, that to yield to her opinions and to gratify her wishes, will be the free will offering of the heart. But this is to be all accomplished in the domestic and social circle. There let every woman become so cultivated and refined in intellect, that her taste and judgment will be respected; so benevolent in feeling and action; that her motives will be reverenced; `" so unassuming and unambitious, that collision and competition will be banished; `" so `gentle and easy to be entreated,` as that every heart will repose in her presence; then, the fathers, the husbands, and the sons, will find an influence thrown around them, to which they will yield not only willingly but proudly... A woman may seek the aid of co-operation and combination among her own sex, to assist her in her appropriate offices of piety, charity, maternal and domestic duty; but whatever, in any measure, throws a woman into the attitude of a combatant, either for herself or others `" whatever binds her in a party conflict `" whatever obliges her in any way to exert coercive influences, throws her out of her appropriate sphere. If these general principles are correct, they are entirely opposed to the plan of arraying females in any Abolition movement. Passage 2 -The investigation of the rights of the slave has led me to a better understanding of my own. I have found the Anti-Slavery cause to be the high school of morals in our land `" the school in which human rights are more fully investigated, and better understood and taught, than in any other. Here a great fundamental principle is uplifted and illuminated, and from this central light, rays innumerable stream all around. Human beings have rights, because they are moral beings: the rights of all men grow out of their moral nature; and as all men have the same moral nature, they have essentially the same rights. These rights may be wrested from the slave, but they cannot be alienated: his title to himself is as perfect now, as is that of Lyman Beecher*: it is stamped on his moral being, and is, like it, imperishable. Now if rights are founded in the nature of our moral being, then the mere circumstance of sex does not give to man higher rights and responsibilities, than to woman. To suppose that it does, would be to deny the self-evident truth, that the `physical constitution is the mere instrument of the moral nature.` To suppose that it does, would be to break up utterly the relations, of the two natures, and to reverse their functions, exalting the animal nature into a monarch, and humbling the moral into a slave; making the former a proprietor, and the latter its property.
When human beings are regarded as moral beings, sex, instead of being enthroned upon the summit, administering upon rights and responsibilities, sinks into insignificance and nothingness. My doctrine then is, that whatever it is morally right for man to do, it is morally right for woman to do. Our duties originate, not from difference of sex, but from the diversity of our relations in life, the various gifts and talents committed to our care, and the different eras in which we live. * Lyman Beecher was a famous minister and the father of Catharine Beecher. In Passage 2, Grimk ֳ © makes which point about human rights?

  1. They are viewed differently in various cultures around the world.
  2. They retain their moral authority regardless of whether they are recognized by law.
  3. They are sometimes at odds with moral responsibilities.
  4. They have become more advanced and refined throughout history.

Answer(s): B

Explanation:

Justification
Correct choice – B – Grimké argues that human rights are grounded in moral nature, not in legal recognition; therefore they “retain their moral authority regardless of whether they are recognized by law.” This directly reflects her statement that “rights … cannot be alienated” and that “the rights of all men grow out of their moral nature.”
Why A is incorrect – The passage never discusses cultural variations or “different cultures around the world.” It focuses on the universal moral basis of rights, not on cultural relativism.
Why C is incorrect – Grimké does not claim that rights conflict with moral responsibilities; rather, she asserts that duties arise from one’s relations and talents, not from sex. There is no indication of “at odds” between rights and responsibilities.
Why D is incorrect – The text does not present rights as having “become more advanced and refined throughout history.” Instead, it emphasizes their timeless, immutable character rooted in moral being.


Reference:

Document 1: Library of Congress – The Grimké Letters (digital copy of “Letters to Catharine Beecher,” 1838). https://www.loc.gov/item/2015600185/ Document 2: Internet Archive – Angelina Grimké, “Letters to Catharine Beecher” (full text, 1838). https://archive.org/details/letterstocatherin00grim/page/14/mode/2up



Passage 1 is adapted from Catharine Beecher, Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism. Originally published in 1837. Passage 2 is adapted from Angelina E. Grimk ֳ ©, Letters to Catharine Beecher. Originally published in 1838. Grimk ֳ © encouraged Southern women to oppose slavery publicly. Passage 1 is Beecher's response to Grimk ֳ ©'s views. Passage 2 is Grimk ֳ ©'s response to Beecher. Passage 1 -Heaven has appointed to one sex the superior, and to the other the subordinate station, and this without any reference to the character or conduct of either. It is therefore as much for the dignity as it is for the interest of females, in all respects to conform to the duties of this relation... But while woman holds a subordinate relation in society to the other sex, it is not because it was designed that her duties or her influence should be any the less important, or all pervading. But it was designed that the mode of gaining influence and of exercising power should be altogether different and peculiar... A man may act on society by the collision of intellect, in public debate; he may urge his measures by a sense of shame, by fear and by personal interest; he may coerce by the combination of public sentiment; he may drive by physical force, and he does not outstep the boundaries of his sphere. But all the power, and all the conquests that are lawful to woman, are those only which appeal to the kindly, generous, peaceful and benevolent principles. Woman is to win everything by peace and love; by making herself so much respected, esteemed and loved, that to yield to her opinions and to gratify her wishes, will be the free will offering of the heart. But this is to be all accomplished in the domestic and social circle. There let every woman become so cultivated and refined in intellect, that her taste and judgment will be respected; so benevolent in feeling and action; that her motives will be reverenced; `" so unassuming and unambitious, that collision and competition will be banished; `" so `gentle and easy to be entreated,` as that every heart will repose in her presence; then, the fathers, the husbands, and the sons, will find an influence thrown around them, to which they will yield not only willingly but proudly... A woman may seek the aid of co-operation and combination among her own sex, to assist her in her appropriate offices of piety, charity, maternal and domestic duty; but whatever, in any measure, throws a woman into the attitude of a combatant, either for herself or others `" whatever binds her in a party conflict `" whatever obliges her in any way to exert coercive influences, throws her out of her appropriate sphere. If these general principles are correct, they are entirely opposed to the plan of arraying females in any Abolition movement. Passage 2 -The investigation of the rights of the slave has led me to a better understanding of my own. I have found the Anti-Slavery cause to be the high school of morals in our land `" the school in which human rights are more fully investigated, and better understood and taught, than in any other. Here a great fundamental principle is uplifted and illuminated, and from this central light, rays innumerable stream all around. Human beings have rights, because they are moral beings: the rights of all men grow out of their moral nature; and as all men have the same moral nature, they have essentially the same rights. These rights may be wrested from the slave, but they cannot be alienated: his title to himself is as perfect now, as is that of Lyman Beecher*: it is stamped on his moral being, and is, like it, imperishable. Now if rights are founded in the nature of our moral being, then the mere circumstance of sex does not give to man higher rights and responsibilities, than to woman. To suppose that it does, would be to deny the self-evident truth, that the `physical constitution is the mere instrument of the moral nature.` To suppose that it does, would be to break up utterly the relations, of the two natures, and to reverse their functions, exalting the animal nature into a monarch, and humbling the moral into a slave; making the former a proprietor, and the latter its property.
When human beings are regarded as moral beings, sex, instead of being enthroned upon the summit, administering upon rights and responsibilities, sinks into insignificance and nothingness. My doctrine then is, that whatever it is morally right for man to do, it is morally right for woman to do. Our duties originate, not from difference of sex, but from the diversity of our relations in life, the various gifts and talents committed to our care, and the different eras in which we live. * Lyman Beecher was a famous minister and the father of Catharine Beecher.
Which choice best states the relationship between the two passages (Passage 1 and Passage 2)?

  1. Passage 2 illustrates the practical difficulties of a proposal made in Passage 1.
  2. Passage 2 takes issue with the primary argument of Passage 1.
  3. Passage 2 provides a historical context for the perspective offered in Passage 1.
  4. Passage 2 elaborates upon several ideas implied in Passage 1.

Answer(s): B

Explanation:

Justification for selecting option B
Core conflict of ideas – Passage 1 (Beecher) argues that a woman’s proper sphere is domestic and that her influence must be exercised solely through peace, love, and moral suasion, expressly rejecting any public or political activism such as abolitionism. Direct rebuttal – Passage 2 (Grimké) confronts this claim by asserting that moral rights are universal and that women, as moral agents, have the same duty to engage in public reform, including the abolition of slavery. She explicitly refutes Beecher’s restriction on women’s sphere of action. Therefore – The relationship is best described as Passage 2 taking issue with the primary argument of Passage 1, which matches option B.
Why the other options are unsuitable
Option A (practical difficulties) – Neither passage discusses logistical obstacles or implementation challenges; the disagreement is ideological, not procedural. Option C (historical context) – Passage 2 does not merely provide background; it actively challenges Beecher’s position, moving beyond contextual description. Option D (elaboration of implied ideas) – Grimké does not simply expand on Beecher’s implied points; she opposes them, introducing a contrasting moral principle rather than elaborating.


Reference:

Beecher, Catharine E. An Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism. 1837. https://archive.org/details/essayonslaveryab00bee Grimké, Angelina E. Letters to Catharine Beecher. 1838. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/23657



Passage 1 is adapted from Catharine Beecher, Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism. Originally published in 1837. Passage 2 is adapted from Angelina E. Grimk ֳ ©,
Letters to Catharine Beecher. Originally published in 1838. Grimk ֳ © encouraged Southern women to oppose slavery publicly. Passage 1 is Beecher's response to Grimk ֳ ©'s views. Passage 2 is Grimk ֳ ©'s response to Beecher. Passage 1 -Heaven has appointed to one sex the superior, and to the other the subordinate station, and this without any reference to the character or conduct of either. It is therefore as much for the dignity as it is for the interest of females, in all respects to conform to the duties of this relation... But while woman holds a subordinate relation in society to the other sex, it is not because it was designed that her duties or her influence should be any the less important, or all pervading. But it was designed that the mode of gaining influence and of exercising power should be altogether different and peculiar... A man may act on society by the collision of intellect, in public debate; he may urge his measures by a sense of shame, by fear and by personal interest; he may coerce by the combination of public sentiment; he may drive by physical force, and he does not outstep the boundaries of his sphere. But all the power, and all the conquests that are lawful to woman, are those only which appeal to the kindly, generous, peaceful and benevolent principles. Woman is to win everything by peace and love; by making herself so much respected, esteemed and loved, that to yield to her opinions and to gratify her wishes, will be the free will offering of the heart. But this is to be all accomplished in the domestic and social circle. There let every woman become so cultivated and refined in intellect, that her taste and judgment will be respected; so benevolent in feeling and action; that her motives will be reverenced; `" so unassuming and unambitious, that collision and competition will be banished; `" so `gentle and easy to be entreated,` as that every heart will repose in her presence; then, the fathers, the husbands, and the sons, will find an influence thrown around them, to which they will yield not only willingly but proudly... A woman may seek the aid of co-operation and combination among her own sex, to assist her in her appropriate offices of piety, charity, maternal and domestic duty; but whatever, in any measure, throws a woman into the attitude of a combatant, either for herself or others `" whatever binds her in a party conflict `" whatever obliges her in any way to exert coercive influences, throws her out of her appropriate sphere. If these general principles are correct, they are entirely opposed to the plan of arraying females in any Abolition movement. Passage 2 -The investigation of the rights of the slave has led me to a better understanding of my own. I have found the Anti-Slavery cause to be the high school of morals in our land `" the school in which human rights are more fully investigated, and better understood and taught, than in any other. Here a great fundamental principle is uplifted and illuminated, and from this central light, rays innumerable stream all around. Human beings have rights, because they are moral beings: the rights of all men grow out of their moral nature; and as all men have the same moral nature, they have essentially the same rights. These rights may be wrested from the slave, but they cannot be alienated: his title to himself is as perfect now, as is that of Lyman Beecher*: it is stamped on his moral being, and is, like it, imperishable. Now if rights are founded in the nature of our moral being, then the mere circumstance of sex does not give to man higher rights and responsibilities, than to woman. To suppose that it does, would be to deny the self-evident truth, that the `physical constitution is the mere instrument of the moral nature.` To suppose that it does, would be to break up utterly the relations, of the two natures, and to reverse their functions, exalting the animal nature into a monarch, and humbling the moral into a slave; making the former a proprietor, and the latter its property.
When human beings are regarded as moral beings, sex, instead of being enthroned upon the summit, administering upon rights and responsibilities, sinks into insignificance and nothingness. My doctrine then is, that whatever it is morally right for man to do, it is morally right for woman to do. Our duties originate, not from difference of sex, but from the diversity of our relations in life, the various gifts and talents committed to our care, and the different eras in which we live. * Lyman Beecher was a famous minister and the father of Catharine Beecher. Based on the passages (Passage 1 and Passage 2), both authors would agree with which of the following claims?

  1. Women have moral duties and responsibilities.
  2. Men often work selflessly for political change.
  3. The ethical obligations of women are often undervalued.
  4. Political activism is as important for women as it is for men.

Answer(s): A

Explanation:

Justification
Option A – “Women have moral duties and responsibilities.”
Both passages explicitly link women’s influence to moral principles. Passage 1 states that a woman’s power
“appeals to the kindly, generous, peaceful and benevolent principles” and that her duties are “piety, charity, maternal and domestic duty.” Passage 2 argues that moral rights and duties are grounded in human moral nature, not in sex, thereby affirming that women possess moral obligations identical to men. This directly supports the claim that women have moral duties and responsibilities.
Option B – “Men often work selflessly for political change.”
The texts focus on women’s sphere of influence, not on men’s self-sacrificial political activism. Although men’s public methods are mentioned, the passages do not highlight male selflessness; they merely contrast the ways men and women exercise power. Therefore this option is not substantiated by the passages.
Option C – “The ethical obligations of women are often undervalued.”
While the authors critique the limited public role of women, they do not argue that society undervalues women’s ethics. Instead, they prescribe a distinct but equally important moral sphere for women. The claim of undervaluation introduces an external sociological judgment that is not explicitly made in either passage.
Option D – “Political activism is as important for women as it is for men.”
Passage 1 explicitly warns against women entering “any Abolition movement” and condemns “coercive influences” and “party conflict.” Passage 2 advocates for moral rights but does not call for women to engage in the same political activism as men; it emphasizes a separate, non-combative moral sphere. Hence, the passages do not endorse equal political activism.
Conclusion The only claim that is directly supported by both passages is that women possess moral duties and responsibilities, making Option A the correct answer.


Reference:

Beecher, C. (1837). Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24738
Grimké, A. E. (1838). Letters to Catharine Beecher. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24739



Passage 1 is adapted from Catharine Beecher, Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism. Originally published in 1837. Passage 2 is adapted from Angelina E. Grimk ֳ ©, Letters to Catharine Beecher. Originally published in 1838. Grimk ֳ © encouraged Southern women to oppose slavery publicly. Passage 1 is Beecher's response to Grimk ֳ ©'s views. Passage 2 is Grimk ֳ ©'s response to Beecher. Passage 1 -Heaven has appointed to one sex the superior, and to the other the subordinate station, and this without any reference to the character or conduct of either. It is therefore as much for the dignity as it is for the interest of females, in all respects to conform to the duties of this relation... But while woman holds a subordinate relation in society to the other sex, it is not because it was designed that her duties or her influence should be any the less important, or all pervading. But it was designed that the mode of gaining influence and of exercising power should be altogether different and peculiar... A man may act on society by the collision of intellect, in public debate; he may urge his measures by a sense of shame, by fear and by personal interest; he may coerce by the combination of public sentiment; he may drive by physical force, and he does not outstep the boundaries of his sphere. But all the power, and all the conquests that are lawful to woman, are those only which appeal to the kindly, generous, peaceful and benevolent principles. Woman is to win everything by peace and love; by making herself so much respected, esteemed and loved, that to yield to her opinions and to gratify her wishes, will be the free will offering of the heart. But this is to be all accomplished in the domestic and social circle. There let every woman become so cultivated and refined in intellect, that her taste and judgment will be respected; so benevolent in feeling and action; that her motives will be reverenced; `" so unassuming and unambitious, that collision and competition will be banished; `" so `gentle and easy to be entreated,` as that every heart will repose in her presence; then, the fathers, the husbands, and the sons, will find an influence thrown around them, to which they will yield not only willingly but proudly... A woman may seek the aid of co-operation and combination among her own sex, to assist her in her appropriate offices of piety, charity, maternal and domestic duty; but whatever, in any measure, throws a woman into the attitude of a combatant, either for herself or others `" whatever binds her in a party conflict `" whatever obliges her in any way to exert coercive influences, throws her out of her appropriate sphere. If these general principles are correct, they are entirely opposed to the plan of arraying females in any Abolition movement. Passage 2 -The investigation of the rights of the slave has led me to a better understanding of my own. I have found the Anti-Slavery cause to be the high school of morals in our land `" the school in which human rights are more fully investigated, and better understood and taught, than in any other. Here a great fundamental principle is uplifted and illuminated, and from this central light, rays innumerable stream all around. Human beings have rights, because they are moral beings: the rights of all men grow out of their moral nature; and as all men have the same moral nature, they have essentially the same rights. These rights may be wrested from the slave, but they cannot be alienated: his title to himself is as perfect now, as is that of Lyman Beecher*: it is stamped on his moral being, and is, like it, imperishable. Now if rights are founded in the nature of our moral being, then the mere circumstance of sex does not give to man higher rights and responsibilities, than to woman. To suppose that it does, would be to deny the self-evident truth, that the `physical constitution is the mere instrument of the moral nature.` To suppose that it does, would be to break up utterly the relations, of the two natures, and to reverse their functions, exalting the animal nature into a monarch, and humbling the moral into a slave; making the former a proprietor, and the latter its property.
When human beings are regarded as moral beings, sex, instead of being enthroned upon the summit, administering upon rights and responsibilities, sinks into insignificance and nothingness. My doctrine then is, that whatever it is morally right for man to do, it is morally right for woman to do. Our duties originate, not from difference of sex, but from the diversity of our relations in life, the various gifts and talents committed to our care, and the different eras in which we live. * Lyman Beecher was a famous minister and the father of Catharine Beecher. Beecher would most likely have reacted to sentence 3 of paragraph 2 of Passage 2 (`Now ... woman`) with:

  1. sympathy, because she feels that human beings owe each other a debt to work together in the world.
  2. agreement, because she feels that human responsibilities are a natural product of human rights.
  3. dismay, because she feels that women actually have a more difficult role to play in society than men do.
  4. disagreement, because she feels that the natures of men and women are fundamentally different.

Answer(s): D

Explanation:

Why option D is the only appropriate response
Core of Beecher’s ideology – In Passage 1 Beecher repeatedly stresses that the “nature” of women is defined by a separate, domestic sphere in which their influence is exercised through “peace and love,” not through public or political action. Contrast with the claim in Passage 2 – The author of Passage 2 argues that moral rights are identical for men and women and that “whatever it is morally right for man to do, it is morally right for woman to do.” This directly challenges Beecher’s premise that the two sexes possess fundamentally different natures and therefore different appropriate spheres of activity. Beecher’s likely reaction – Given her conviction that “the natures of men and women are fundamentally different,” she would disagree with the statement that moral duties are interchangeable across sexes. Her disagreement is not rooted in sympathy, agreement, or personal dismay, but in a doctrinal opposition to the notion of a shared moral nature.
Why the other choices do not fit

A: Sympathy about a “debt to work together” – Beecher never frames women’s role as a collective debt or a duty to cooperate with men in a universal moral project; her focus is on distinct spheres, not on mutual debt.
B: Agreement that responsibilities are a natural product of rights – Beecher rejects the idea that rights automatically generate identical responsibilities for both sexes; she maintains that responsibilities flow from one’s designated sphere, which is gender-specific. C. Dismay that women have a “more difficult role” – While Beecher acknowledges the constraints placed on women, she does not express personal dismay or view their role as inherently more difficult; rather, she presents it as a divinely ordained order.
Hence, the statement that “the natures of men and women are fundamentally different” (option D) best captures the reaction Beecher would have to the third sentence of paragraph 2 in Passage 2.


Reference:

Beecher, Catharine E. An Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism. 1837. (Full text available via the Library of Congress digital collections: https://www.loc.gov/item/2004672745/ ) Grimké, Angelina E. Letters to Catharine Beecher. 1838. (Digitized at the Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/letterstocatherin00grim )



This passage is adapted from Bryan Walsh, `Whole Food Blues: Why Organic Agriculture May Not Be So Sustainable.` ֲ ©2012 by Time Incorporated.
When it comes to energy, everyone loves efficiency. Cutting energy waste is one of those goals that both sides of the political divide can agree on, even if they sometimes diverge on how best to get there. Energy efficiency allows us to get more out of our given resources, which is good for the economy and (mostly) good for the environment as well. In an increasingly hot and crowded world, the only sustainable way to live is to get more out of less. Every environmentalist would agree. But change the conversation to food, and suddenly efficiency doesn't look so good. Conventional industrial agriculture has become incredibly efficient on a simple land to food basis. Thanks to fertilizers, mechanization and irrigation, each American farmer feeds over 155 people worldwide. Conventional farming gets more and more crop per square foot of cultivated land `" over 170 bushels of corn per acre in Iowa, for example `" which can mean less territory needs to be converted from wilderness to farmland. And since a third of the planet is already used for agriculture `" destroying forests and other wild habitats along the way `" anything that could help us produce more food on less land would seem to be good for the environment. Of course, that's not how most environmentalists regard their arugula [a leafy green]. They have embraced organic food as better for the planet `" and healthier and tastier, too `" than the stuff produced by agricultural corporations. Environmentalists disdain the enormous amounts of energy needed and waste created by conventional farming, while organic practices `" forgoing artificial fertilizers and chemical pesticides `" are considered far more sustainable. Sales of organic food rose 7.7% in 2010, up to $26.7 billion `" and people are making those purchases for their consciences as much as their taste buds. Yet a new meta-analysis in Nature does the math and comes to a hard conclusion: organic farming yields 25% fewer crops on average than conventional agriculture. More land is therefore needed to produce fewer crops `" and that means organic farming may not be as good for the planet as we think. In the Nature analysis, scientists from McGill University in Montreal and the University of Minnesota performed an analysis of 66 studies comparing conventional and organic methods across 34 different crop species, from fruits to grains to legumes. They found that organic farming delivered a lower yield for every crop type, though the disparity varied widely. For rain watered legume crops like beans or perennial crops like fruit trees, organic trailed conventional agriculture by just 5%. Yet for major cereal crops like corn or wheat, as well as most vegetables `" all of which provide the bulk of the world's calories `" conventional agriculture outperformed organics by more than 25%. The main difference is nitrogen, the chemical key to plant growth. Conventional agriculture makes use of 171 million metric tons of synthetic fertilizer each year, and all that nitrogen enables much faster plant growth than the slower release of nitrogen from the compost or cover crops used in organic farming.
When we talk about a Green Revolution, we really mean a nitrogen revolution `" along with a lot of water. But not all the nitrogen used in conventional fertilizer ends up in crops `" much of it ends up running off the soil and into the oceans, creating vast polluted dead zones. We're already putting more nitrogen into the soil than the planet can stand over the long term. And conventional agriculture also depends heavily on chemical pesticides, which can have unintended side effects.
What that means is that while conventional agriculture is more efficient `" sometimes much more efficient `" than organic farming, there are trade-offs with each. So an ideal global agriculture system, in the views of the study's authors, may borrow the best from both systems, as Jonathan Foley of the University of Minnesota explained:
`The bottom line? Today's organic farming practices are probably best deployed in fruit and vegetable farms, where growing nutrition (not just bulk calories) is the primary goal. But for delivering sheer calories, especially in our staple crops of wheat, rice, maize, soybeans and so on, conventional farms have the advantage right now. Looking forward, I think we will need to deploy different kinds of practices (especially new, mixed approaches that take the best of organic and conventional farming systems) where they are best suited `" geographically, economically, socially, etc.`

As used in sentence 2 of paragraph 2, the word `simple` most nearly means:

  1. straightforward.
  2. modest.
  3. unadorned.
  4. easy.

Answer(s): A

Explanation:

Choice straightforward. is the best answer. In sentence 2 of paragraph 2, the passage states that industrial agriculture has become incredibly efficient on a simple land to food basis. In this context, simple suggests something basic or straightforward.
Other choices are incorrect because in the context of a land to food dynamic, the word simple suggests something basic or straightforward, not something humble, something without any decoration or ornamentation, or something that requires little effort.



This passage is adapted from Bryan Walsh, `Whole Food Blues: Why Organic Agriculture May Not Be So Sustainable.` ֲ ©2012 by Time Incorporated.
When it comes to energy, everyone loves efficiency. Cutting energy waste is one of those goals that both sides of the political divide can agree on, even if they sometimes diverge on how best to get there. Energy efficiency allows us to get more out of our given resources, which is good for the economy and (mostly) good for the environment as well. In an increasingly hot and crowded world, the only sustainable way to live is to get more out of less. Every environmentalist would agree. But change the conversation to food, and suddenly efficiency doesn't look so good. Conventional industrial agriculture has become incredibly efficient on a simple land to food basis. Thanks to fertilizers, mechanization and irrigation, each American farmer feeds over 155 people worldwide. Conventional farming gets more and more crop per square foot of cultivated land `" over 170 bushels of corn per acre in Iowa, for example `" which can mean less territory needs to be converted from wilderness to farmland. And since a third of the planet is already used for agriculture `" destroying forests and other wild habitats along the way `" anything that could help us produce more food on less land would seem to be good for the environment. Of course, that's not how most environmentalists regard their arugula [a leafy green]. They have embraced organic food as better for the planet `" and healthier and tastier, too `" than the stuff produced by agricultural corporations. Environmentalists disdain the enormous amounts of energy needed and waste created by conventional farming, while organic practices `" forgoing artificial fertilizers and chemical pesticides `" are considered far more sustainable. Sales of organic food rose 7.7% in 2010, up to $26.7 billion `" and people are making those purchases for their consciences as much as their taste buds. Yet a new meta-analysis in Nature does the math and comes to a hard conclusion: organic farming yields 25% fewer crops on average than conventional agriculture. More land is therefore needed to produce fewer crops `" and that means organic farming may not be as good for the planet as we think. In the Nature analysis, scientists from McGill University in Montreal and the University of Minnesota performed an analysis of 66 studies comparing conventional and organic methods across 34 different crop species, from fruits to grains to legumes. They found that organic farming delivered a lower yield for every crop type, though the disparity varied widely. For rain watered legume crops like beans or perennial crops like fruit trees, organic trailed conventional agriculture by just 5%. Yet for major cereal crops like corn or wheat, as well as most vegetables `" all of which provide the bulk of the world's calories `" conventional agriculture outperformed organics by more than 25%. The main difference is nitrogen, the chemical key to plant growth. Conventional agriculture makes use of 171 million metric tons of synthetic fertilizer each year, and all that nitrogen enables much faster plant growth than the slower release of nitrogen from the compost or cover crops used in organic farming.
When we talk about a Green Revolution, we really mean a nitrogen revolution `" along with a lot of water. But not all the nitrogen used in conventional fertilizer ends up in crops `" much of it ends up running off the soil and into the oceans, creating vast polluted dead zones. We're already putting more nitrogen into the soil than the planet can stand over the long term. And conventional agriculture also depends heavily on chemical pesticides, which can have unintended side effects.
What that means is that while conventional agriculture is more efficient `" sometimes much more efficient `" than organic farming, there are trade-offs with each. So an ideal global agriculture system, in the views of the study's authors, may borrow the best from both systems, as Jonathan Foley of the University of Minnesota explained: `The bottom line? Today's organic farming practices are probably best deployed in fruit and vegetable farms, where growing nutrition (not just bulk calories) is the primary goal. But for delivering sheer calories, especially in our staple crops of wheat, rice, maize, soybeans and so on, conventional farms have the advantage right now. Looking forward, I think we will need to deploy different kinds of practices (especially new, mixed approaches that take the best of organic and conventional farming systems) where they are best suited `" geographically, economically, socially, etc.`

According to the passage, a significant attribute of conventional agriculture is its ability to:

  1. produce a wide variety of fruits and vegetables.
  2. maximize the output of cultivated land.
  3. satisfy the dietary needs of the world's population.
  4. lessen the necessity of nitrogen in plant growth.

Answer(s): B

Explanation:

Choice [maximize the output of cultivated land.] is the best answer. The passage clearly states that conventional agriculture is very efficient, especially when compared to organic farming: organic farming yields 25% fewer crops on average than conventional agriculture (sentence 1 of paragraph 4) and in a study organic farming delivered a lower yield for every crop type (sentence 2 of paragraph 5). It can therefore be understood from the passage that conventional agriculture does a good job maximizing the output of the land that is farmed. Choice [produce a wide variety of fruits and vegetables.] is incorrect because the passage states how efficient conventional agriculture is in regard to the amount of food it can produce but does not indicate that it produces a significantly wide variety of fruits and vegetables. Choice [satisfy the dietary needs of the world's population.] is incorrect because even if the passage does say that each American farmer can produce crops to feed over 155 people worldwide (sentence 2 of paragraph 2), it never claims that conventional agriculture can satisfactorily feed everyone in the world. Choice [lessen the necessity of nitrogen in plant growth.] is incorrect because the passage states that conventional agriculture uses a great deal of nitrogen, not that it changes the need for nitrogen in plant growth one way or the other.



This passage is adapted from Bryan Walsh, `Whole Food Blues: Why Organic Agriculture May Not Be So Sustainable.` ֲ ©2012 by Time Incorporated.
When it comes to energy, everyone loves efficiency. Cutting energy waste is one of those goals that both sides of the political divide can agree on, even if they sometimes diverge on how best to get there. Energy efficiency allows us to get more out of our given resources, which is good for the economy and (mostly) good for the environment as well. In an increasingly hot and crowded world, the only sustainable way to live is to get more out of less. Every environmentalist would agree. But change the conversation to food, and suddenly efficiency doesn't look so good. Conventional industrial agriculture has become incredibly efficient on a simple land to food basis. Thanks to fertilizers, mechanization and irrigation, each American farmer feeds over 155 people worldwide. Conventional farming gets more and more crop per square foot of cultivated land `" over 170 bushels of corn per acre in Iowa, for example `" which can mean less territory needs to be converted from wilderness to farmland. And since a third of the planet is already used for agriculture `" destroying forests and other wild habitats along the way `" anything that could help us produce more food on less land would seem to be good for the environment. Of course, that's not how most environmentalists regard their arugula [a leafy green]. They have embraced organic food as better for the planet `" and healthier and tastier, too `" than the stuff produced by agricultural corporations. Environmentalists disdain the enormous amounts of energy needed and waste created by conventional farming, while organic practices `" forgoing artificial fertilizers and chemical pesticides `" are considered far more sustainable. Sales of organic food rose 7.7% in 2010, up to $26.7 billion `" and people are making those purchases for their consciences as much as their taste buds. Yet a new meta-analysis in Nature does the math and comes to a hard conclusion: organic farming yields 25% fewer crops on average than conventional agriculture. More land is therefore needed to produce fewer crops `" and that means organic farming may not be as good for the planet as we think. In the Nature analysis, scientists from McGill University in Montreal and the University of Minnesota performed an analysis of 66 studies comparing conventional and organic methods across 34 different crop species, from fruits to grains to legumes. They found that organic farming delivered a lower yield for every crop type, though the disparity varied widely. For rain watered legume crops like beans or perennial crops like fruit trees, organic trailed conventional agriculture by just 5%. Yet for major cereal crops like corn or wheat, as well as most vegetables `" all of which provide the bulk of the world's calories `" conventional agriculture outperformed organics by more than 25%. The main difference is nitrogen, the chemical key to plant growth. Conventional agriculture makes use of 171 million metric tons of synthetic fertilizer each year, and all that nitrogen enables much faster plant growth than the slower release of nitrogen from the compost or cover crops used in organic farming.
When we talk about a Green Revolution, we really mean a nitrogen revolution `" along with a lot of water. But not all the nitrogen used in conventional fertilizer ends up in crops `" much of it ends up running off the soil and into the oceans, creating vast polluted dead zones. We're already putting more nitrogen into the soil than the planet can stand over the long term. And conventional agriculture also depends heavily on chemical pesticides, which can have unintended side effects.
What that means is that while conventional agriculture is more efficient `" sometimes much more efficient `" than organic farming, there are trade-offs with each. So an ideal global agriculture system, in the views of the study's authors, may borrow the best from both systems, as Jonathan Foley of the University of Minnesota explained: `The bottom line? Today's organic farming practices are probably best deployed in fruit and vegetable farms, where growing nutrition (not just bulk calories) is the primary goal. But for delivering sheer calories, especially in our staple crops of wheat, rice, maize, soybeans and so on, conventional farms have the advantage right now. Looking forward, I think we will need to deploy different kinds of practices (especially new, mixed approaches that take the best of organic and conventional farming systems) where they are best suited `" geographically, economically, socially, etc.`

Which choice best reflects the perspective of the `environmentalists` (sentence 1 of paragraph 3) on conventional agriculture?

  1. It produces inferior fruits and vegetables and is detrimental to the environment.
  2. It is energy efficient and reduces the need to convert wilderness to farmland.
  3. It is good for the environment only in the short run.
  4. It depletes critical resources but protects wildlife habitats.

Answer(s): A

Explanation:

Choice [It produces inferior fruits and vegetables and...] is the best answer. The passage makes it clear that most environmentalists (sentence 1 of paragraph 3) believe conventional agriculture produces food that is not as healthy as food produced through organic farming and that it is more harmful to the environment than organic farming is: many environmentalists have embraced organic food as better for the planet " and healthier and tastier, too " than the stuff produced by agricultural corporations (sentence 2 of paragraph 3). Other choices are incorrect because they are not supported by the passage. The passage never states that many environmentalists believe that conventional farming reduces the need to convert wilderness to farmland, is in any way good for the environment, or protects wildlife habitats.



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