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Law School Admission Test: Logical Reasoning, Reading Comprehension, Analytical Reasoning Questions 474–478 (page: 96)

Jurors are required to base their verdicts exclusively on the evidence presented to them at trial, since outside information may violate the substantive norms embodied in the rules of evidence ­ for example, that hearsay is unreliable, and that evidence should be subjected to the adversarial processes of cross-examination and rebuttal. Accordingly, courts have historically admonished jurors against conducting outside research. Some degree of noncompliance has always been a problem ­ albeit a minor one ­ with stray jurors looking up ambiguous terms in dictionaries or visiting accident scenes, for instance. Today, however, the Internet has made that problem dramatically worse. In a recent high-profile trial, 75 percent of the jurors were discovered to have independently conducted their own Internet research on the trial.

Responses to the ubiquity of Internet-based outside research have varied. Courts have, for example, tried confiscating mobile phones or banning their use during trial ­ an unpopular measure ineffectual against research conducted during after-trial hours. Other courts have tried amending their boilerplate juror admonitions to explicitly mention Internet research. But such amendments overlook the fact that many jurors do not realize that conducting Internet searches for the names of the defendants constitutes obtaining evidence, rather than being a mere benign manifestation of the unconscious habit of looking up something about which one is curious. Using even more explicit instructions ­ as one judge does, enjoining jurors not to "read about the subject matter or parties of the case on blogs, Internet news sites, or social media" ­ faces an important obstacle: Even jurors who fully understand the scope of impermissible research may be motivated to conduct their own investigations by a sense that it is their moral duty to conduct independent investigations before rendering a decision. Some jurors believe that, despite the judge's legal instructions, they have a higher duty to arrive at a fair judgment using all facts obtainable by any means whatsoever. A complete solution to the problem of jurors' independent investigations must address, therefore, jurors' perceived "moral duty" to render verdicts based on complete information.

Rather than discourage jurors' sense of moral duty, courts should strive to redirect it, educating jurors as to the powerful reasons why it is their duty to avoid, rather than seek out, outside information. In particular, preliminary instruction, now dedicated only to admonishing jurors as to what behavior is prohibited, should be used to explain to jurors why their access to information is limited, and to persuade jurors that not all information is helpful, and that some is positively unhelpful, to their decision-making process. Otherwise, jurors' sense of moral duty will continue to be misdirected, and restrictions on accessing information will continue to be perceived as, at best, a set of arbitrary rules and, at worst, a subversion of justice.

The passage mentions each of the following as methods that courts have used to discourage jurors from conducting outside research except:

Jurors are required to base their verdicts exclusively on the evidence presented to them at trial, since outside information may violate the substantive norms embodied in the rules of evidence ­ for example, that hearsay is unreliable, and that evidence should be subjected to the adversarial processes of cross-examination and rebuttal. Accordingly, courts have historically admonished jurors against conducting outside research. Some degree of noncompliance has always been a problem ­ albeit a minor one ­ with stray jurors looking up ambiguous terms in dictionaries or visiting accident scenes, for instance. Today, however, the Internet has made that problem dramatically worse. In a recent high-profile trial, 75 percent of the jurors were discovered to have independently conducted their own Internet research on the trial.

Responses to the ubiquity of Internet-based outside research have varied. Courts have, for example, tried confiscating mobile phones or banning their use during trial ­ an unpopular measure ineffectual against research conducted during after-trial hours. Other courts have tried amending their boilerplate juror admonitions to explicitly mention Internet research. But such amendments overlook the fact that many jurors do not realize that conducting Internet searches for the names of the defendants constitutes obtaining evidence, rather than being a mere benign manifestation of the unconscious habit of looking up something about which one is curious. Using even more explicit instructions ­ as one judge does, enjoining jurors not to "read about the subject matter or parties of the case on blogs, Internet news sites, or social media" ­ faces an important obstacle: Even jurors who fully understand the scope of impermissible research may be motivated to conduct their own investigations by a sense that it is their moral duty to conduct independent investigations before rendering a decision. Some jurors believe that, despite the judge's legal instructions, they have a higher duty to arrive at a fair judgment using all facts obtainable by any means whatsoever. A complete solution to the problem of jurors' independent investigations must address, therefore, jurors' perceived "moral duty" to render verdicts based on complete information.

Rather than discourage jurors' sense of moral duty, courts should strive to redirect it, educating jurors as to the powerful reasons why it is their duty to avoid, rather than seek out, outside information. In particular, preliminary instruction, now dedicated only to admonishing jurors as to what behavior is prohibited, should be used to explain to jurors why their access to information is limited, and to persuade jurors that not all information is helpful, and that some is positively unhelpful, to their decision-making process. Otherwise, jurors' sense of moral duty will continue to be misdirected, and restrictions on accessing information will continue to be perceived as, at best, a set of arbitrary rules and, at worst, a subversion of justice.

It can be inferred from the passage that the author believes that jurors

Jurors are required to base their verdicts exclusively on the evidence presented to them at trial, since outside information may violate the substantive norms embodied in the rules of evidence ­ for example, that hearsay is unreliable, and that evidence should be subjected to the adversarial processes of cross-examination and rebuttal. Accordingly, courts have historically admonished jurors against conducting outside research. Some degree of noncompliance has always been a problem ­ albeit a minor one ­ with stray jurors looking up ambiguous terms in dictionaries or visiting accident scenes, for instance. Today, however, the Internet has made that problem dramatically worse. In a recent high-profile trial, 75 percent of the jurors were discovered to have independently conducted their own Internet research on the trial.

Responses to the ubiquity of Internet-based outside research have varied. Courts have, for example, tried confiscating mobile phones or banning their use during trial ­ an unpopular measure ineffectual against research conducted during after-trial hours. Other courts have tried amending their boilerplate juror admonitions to explicitly mention Internet research. But such amendments overlook the fact that many jurors do not realize that conducting Internet searches for the names of the defendants constitutes obtaining evidence, rather than being a mere benign manifestation of the unconscious habit of looking up something about which one is curious. Using even more explicit instructions ­ as one judge does, enjoining jurors not to "read about the subject matter or parties of the case on blogs, Internet news sites, or social media" ­ faces an important obstacle: Even jurors who fully understand the scope of impermissible research may be motivated to conduct their own investigations by a sense that it is their moral duty to conduct independent investigations before rendering a decision. Some jurors believe that, despite the judge's legal instructions, they have a higher duty to arrive at a fair judgment using all facts obtainable by any means whatsoever. A complete solution to the problem of jurors' independent investigations must address, therefore, jurors' perceived "moral duty" to render verdicts based on complete information.

Rather than discourage jurors' sense of moral duty, courts should strive to redirect it, educating jurors as to the powerful reasons why it is their duty to avoid, rather than seek out, outside information. In particular, preliminary instruction, now dedicated only to admonishing jurors as to what behavior is prohibited, should be used to explain to jurors why their access to information is limited, and to persuade jurors that not all information is helpful, and that some is positively unhelpful, to their decision-making process. Otherwise, jurors' sense of moral duty will continue to be misdirected, and restrictions on accessing information will continue to be perceived as, at best, a set of arbitrary rules and, at worst, a subversion of justice.

In the trial of a defendant accused of theft, each of the following hypothetical jurors clearly violates the prohibition against outside research, as outlined in the passage, except:

Jurors are required to base their verdicts exclusively on the evidence presented to them at trial, since outside information may violate the substantive norms embodied in the rules of evidence ­ for example, that hearsay is unreliable, and that evidence should be subjected to the adversarial processes of cross-examination and rebuttal. Accordingly, courts have historically admonished jurors against conducting outside research. Some degree of noncompliance has always been a problem ­ albeit a minor one ­ with stray jurors looking up ambiguous terms in dictionaries or visiting accident scenes, for instance. Today, however, the Internet has made that problem dramatically worse. In a recent high-profile trial, 75 percent of the jurors were discovered to have independently conducted their own Internet research on the trial.

Responses to the ubiquity of Internet-based outside research have varied. Courts have, for example, tried confiscating mobile phones or banning their use during trial ­ an unpopular measure ineffectual against research conducted during after-trial hours. Other courts have tried amending their boilerplate juror admonitions to explicitly mention Internet research. But such amendments overlook the fact that many jurors do not realize that conducting Internet searches for the names of the defendants constitutes obtaining evidence, rather than being a mere benign manifestation of the unconscious habit of looking up something about which one is curious. Using even more explicit instructions ­ as one judge does, enjoining jurors not to "read about the subject matter or parties of the case on blogs, Internet news sites, or social media" ­ faces an important obstacle: Even jurors who fully understand the scope of impermissible research may be motivated to conduct their own investigations by a sense that it is their moral duty to conduct independent investigations before rendering a decision. Some jurors believe that, despite the judge's legal instructions, they have a higher duty to arrive at a fair judgment using all facts obtainable by any means whatsoever. A complete solution to the problem of jurors' independent investigations must address, therefore, jurors' perceived "moral duty" to render verdicts based on complete information.

Rather than discourage jurors' sense of moral duty, courts should strive to redirect it, educating jurors as to the powerful reasons why it is their duty to avoid, rather than seek out, outside information. In particular, preliminary instruction, now dedicated only to admonishing jurors as to what behavior is prohibited, should be used to explain to jurors why their access to information is limited, and to persuade jurors that not all information is helpful, and that some is positively unhelpful, to their decision-making process. Otherwise, jurors' sense of moral duty will continue to be misdirected, and restrictions on accessing information will continue to be perceived as, at best, a set of arbitrary rules and, at worst, a subversion of justice.

The primary function of the first paragraph is to

Jurors are required to base their verdicts exclusively on the evidence presented to them at trial, since outside information may violate the substantive norms embodied in the rules of evidence ­ for example, that hearsay is unreliable, and that evidence should be subjected to the adversarial processes of cross-examination and rebuttal. Accordingly, courts have historically admonished jurors against conducting outside research. Some degree of noncompliance has always been a problem ­ albeit a minor one ­ with stray jurors looking up ambiguous terms in dictionaries or visiting accident scenes, for instance. Today, however, the Internet has made that problem dramatically worse. In a recent high-profile trial, 75 percent of the jurors were discovered to have independently conducted their own Internet research on the trial.

Responses to the ubiquity of Internet-based outside research have varied. Courts have, for example, tried confiscating mobile phones or banning their use during trial ­ an unpopular measure ineffectual against research conducted during after-trial hours. Other courts have tried amending their boilerplate juror admonitions to explicitly mention Internet research. But such amendments overlook the fact that many jurors do not realize that conducting Internet searches for the names of the defendants constitutes obtaining evidence, rather than being a mere benign manifestation of the unconscious habit of looking up something about which one is curious. Using even more explicit instructions ­ as one judge does, enjoining jurors not to "read about the subject matter or parties of the case on blogs, Internet news sites, or social media" ­ faces an important obstacle: Even jurors who fully understand the scope of impermissible research may be motivated to conduct their own investigations by a sense that it is their moral duty to conduct independent investigations before rendering a decision. Some jurors believe that, despite the judge's legal instructions, they have a higher duty to arrive at a fair judgment using all facts obtainable by any means whatsoever. A complete solution to the problem of jurors' independent investigations must address, therefore, jurors' perceived "moral duty" to render verdicts based on complete information.

Rather than discourage jurors' sense of moral duty, courts should strive to redirect it, educating jurors as to the powerful reasons why it is their duty to avoid, rather than seek out, outside information. In particular, preliminary instruction, now dedicated only to admonishing jurors as to what behavior is prohibited, should be used to explain to jurors why their access to information is limited, and to persuade jurors that not all information is helpful, and that some is positively unhelpful, to their decision-making process. Otherwise, jurors' sense of moral duty will continue to be misdirected, and restrictions on accessing information will continue to be perceived as, at best, a set of arbitrary rules and, at worst, a subversion of justice.

The author regards the problem of outside research by jurors as